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Analogical reasoning is essential for transfer by supporting recognition of relational similarity. However,
not all analogies are created equal. The source and target can be similar (near), or quite different (far).
Previous research suggests that close comparisons facilitate children’s relational abstraction. On the other
hand, evidence from adults indicates that the process of solving far analogies may be a more effective
scaffold for transfer of a relational strategy. We explore whether engaging with far analogies similarly
induces such a strategy in preschoolers. Children were provided with the opportunity to solve either a
near or far spatial analogy using a pair of puzzle boxes that varied in perceptual similarity (Experiment
1), or to participate in a control task (Experiment 2). All groups were then presented with an ambiguous
spatial reasoning task featuring both object and relational matches. We were interested in the relationship
between near and far conditions and two effects: (a) children’s tendency to spontaneously draw an
analogy when solving the initial puzzle, and (b) their tendency to privilege relational matches over object
matches in a subsequent, ambiguous task. Although children were more likely to spontaneously draw an
analogy in the near condition, those who attempted the far analogy were more likely to privilege a
relational match on the subsequent task. We argue that the process of solving a far analogy—regardless
of a learner’s spontaneous success in identifying the relation—contextualizes an otherwise ambiguous
learning problem, making it easier for children to access and apply relational hypotheses.
Keywords: cognitive development, relational reasoning, inference, representation, analogy
The flexible use and transfer of knowledge is an essential
feature of early learning. Simply acquiring new information is
not enough; this dynamic process depends upon the generaliza-
tion and application of knowledge to novel contexts. However,
in order for a learner to apply what they know, they must first
recognize those situations in which transfer is appropriate. This
becomes increasingly difficult when surface similarities be-
tween the context in which information is learned and the
context in which it must be applied are misleading or unavail-
able as a cue. A well-documented challenge for transfer—
particularly in early childhood—is learning to ignore irrelevant
surface features to attend to relational similarities instead. The
development of analogical reasoning plays a key role in recog-
nizing these relations by mapping correspondences between
objects or events, facilitating generalization.
However, not all analogies are created equal. Instead, the amount of
overlap between domains has been used to characterize an analogy
along a continuum from “near” to “far” (Gentner, 1983; Ward,
1998). That is, in addition to sharing relational structure, source
and target domains can be perceptually and/or conceptually similar
(a near analogy), or quite different (a far analogy). According to
Gentner (2010), the same mapping process operates over near and
far comparisons, with both ultimately highlighting common struc-
ture. Nevertheless, research with adults suggests that solving far
analogies is uniquely associated with increased generalization
and abstraction (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Halpern, Hansen, &
Riefer, 1990; Knowlton, Morrison, Hummel, & Holyoak,
2012), creativity (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Holyoak & Thag-
ard, 1995), innovation (e.g., Dunbar & Blanchette, 2001), un-
derstanding (Barnett & Ceci, 2002), and attention to relations
(Vendetti, Wu, & Holyoak, 2014).
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Overcoming the bias to map features on the basis of perceptual
similarity presents a challenge for children: Their tendency to
focus on surface properties results in fewer instances of relational
mapping. In fact, much of the existing literature suggests that
preschool-aged children often struggle to reason analogically—
that is, they do not tend to privilege relational information (e.g.,
Christie & Gentner, 2010, 2014; Gentner & Rattermann, 1991;
Halford, 1992; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2001; Richland, Morrison,
& Holyoak, 2006), with only limited evidence indicating whether
or not they spontaneously employ analogical reasoning during
problem-solving. This has led to the belief that relational transfer
is difficult to engineer for preschool-aged children. For example,
Crisafi and Brown (1986) presented preschoolers with the oppor-
tunity to transfer a process (i.e., locating a coin and inserting it)
that could be used to obtain a desired object. Children learned this
process using one set of materials (e.g., gumball machine), and
were then provided a new set (e.g., dump truck), that could be
solved by applying the same abstract steps. Results indicated no
evidence of spontaneous transfer, unless explicit instruction (e.g.,
to apply the same solution) was offered.
On the other hand, when minimal scaffolding, such as prompts
to compare or explain are provided, children are far more likely to
succeed (e.g., Brown & Kane, 1988; Brown, Kane, & Echols,
1986; Christie & Gentner, 2010, 2014; Crisafi & Brown, 1986;
Loewenstein & Gentner, 2001; Tunteler & Resing, 2002; Walker,
Bridgers, & Gopnik, 2016; Walker & Lombrozo, 2017). The
benefits of scaffolding on analogical reasoning are often inter-
preted as evidence that children are initially unable to reason about
relations without explicit instruction, language, or cultural input
(e.g., Gentner, 2010; Richland, Zur, & Holyoak, 2007). Then, over
the course of development, children are thought to expand their
understanding of similarity to include relational information (i.e.,
the relational shift, Gentner, 1988). Here we consider an alterna-
tive explanation: scaffolding is successful because it highlights
those contexts in which the application of existing relational hy-
potheses is an appropriate strategy.
What are the conditions under which a relational strategy be-
comes privileged and relevant for young children? Previous re-
search has proposed that the amount of perceptual distance be-
tween the target and source might be manipulated as a cue to
common relational structure. In particular, children are more likely
to spontaneously discover relations in the context of highly similar
pairs, presented in close proximity (i.e., progressive alignment,
Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996). According to Loewenstein and Gent-
ner (2001, p. 215), engaging in the “small step” of comparing
highly alignable objects or events should facilitate the “large step”
of more distant comparisons. They offer evidence for the facilita-
tive effect of close comparison using a search task modeled after
DeLoache’s (1987) classic studies: Children watched an experi-
menter hide a toy in one room, and were then asked to find an
identical toy in the same place in an analogous room. Prompting
children to first compare two highly similar rooms (i.e., containing
the same furniture in the same location, and differing only in
color), facilitated their subsequent performance on a more chal-
lenging version, in which the furniture in the analogous room was
also differently shaped. They conclude that noting the correspon-
dences between highly similar spaces renders common relational
structure more salient, aiding subsequent mapping.
The current experiments assess whether the process of mapping
highly similar spatial objects would also inspire children’s appli-
cation of a relational strategy when generalizing to a novel spatial
task. Or whether children, like adults, might reap greater benefits
from mapping dissimilar cases in the context of a far analogy. In
particular, we examine two issues related to this question. First, we
explore whether distance (near, far) influences children’s tendency
to spontaneously draw an analogy in the absence of explicit instruc-
tion to do so. Second, we investigate whether attempting to generate
solutions to more distant analogies invokes the use of a relational
strategy across distinct tasks.
To do so, 4- and 5-year-olds were first provided the opportunity
to locate a hidden object in the context of either a near or far
analogy (Experiment 1), or in a non-analogy control task (Exper-
iment 2). Unlike in the adult literature, children were not instructed
to use analogical reasoning, since we were interested in examining
children’s spontaneous use of this strategy. Regardless of their
initial tendency to draw an analogy, however, children all had the
opportunity to observe the relational similarity between items.
Next, all children were asked to make selections in a second,
distinct task, in which both object and relational solutions were
available. Although the two tasks were presented as unrelated, they
shared some features: (1) both tasks required that the learner search
for a hidden sticker, and (2) both solutions included a spatial relation.
We therefore examined transfer of a relational strategy in the context
of relatively near transfer (e.g., as compared to Crisafi & Brown,
1986). Given this task similarity, Experiment 2 served as a control
condition, using the same materials to assess children’s baseline
tendency to make relational selections on the subsequent task without
first solving an analogy. Including this baseline condition also al-
lowed us to further explore the condition effects in Experiment 1.
We included 4- and 5-year-olds based on previous studies
demonstrating children’s ability to use relational information in
similar contexts (Blades & Cooke, 1994; Marzolf & DeLoache,
1997). For example, Blades and Cooke (1994) investigated chil-
dren’s use of spatial relations to locate a hidden object when
comparing analogous models of a room. Specifically, they modi-
fied DeLoache’s (1987) task by including two types of hiding
locations: (a) unique items (e.g., under the bed), and (b) twin items
(e.g., behind one of two identical chairs). This change allowed
them to probe changes in strategy. When the hiding place was
unique, children could locate the hidden toy using object similarity
alone (e.g., if the toy is hidden under the bed in Room 1, then
search for the bed in Room 2). However, when the hiding place
included a twin item, children could not rely upon this simpler
strategy. Instead, they were required to reason about spatial rela-
tions in order to successfully distinguish between locations. Re-
sults indicated that 3-year-olds were unable to locate the toy unless
it was hidden in a unique location, suggesting that they relied
exclusively upon object attributes in this task (see also Marzolf &
DeLoache, 1997). By 4 years of age, children could use spatial
relationships to locate the toy in a twin item, as long as the rooms
were highly aligned (i.e., a near analogy), but had difficulty when
they were not (i.e., a far analogy). Only 5-year-olds were success-
ful in all contexts. Given evidence that 4- and 5-year-olds are able
to do this task, but differ in their proficiency, we were interested in
whether children at each age would spontaneously employ ana-
logical reasoning as a solution without an explicit prompt to do so,
and also whether they would generalize this relational strategy.
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1834 WALKER, HUBACHEK, AND VENDETTI
To summarize, the current studies examine relationships be-
tween age, analogical distance (near, far), and two effects: (a) 4-
and 5-year-olds’ tendency to spontaneously generate analogies and
(b) their tendency to privilege relational matches in a subsequent
task. We hypothesized that while children in the near condition
would be more likely to spontaneously generate an analogy on the
first task, children in the far condition would show increased
subsequent relational selections when compared with near and
baseline (Experiment 2) conditions. These findings would support
the claim that children’s difficulties with relational thinking are at
least partly due to a failure to recognize those contexts in which
relational solutions are appropriate.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. A total of 96 4- and 5-year-olds (M  58.6
months, range  47.9–71.2 months, SD  6.6, females  47)
participated, with 48 randomly assigned to near or far conditions.
An additional 7 children were excluded due to experimenter error
(3), failing to complete the experiment (2), or parent intervention
(2). All were recruited from local preschools and museums. Indi-
vidual demographics were not collected, but the population was
largely middle-class, with a range of ethnicities representing the
local diversity. Institutional Review Board approval was obtained
for this research at the University of California, San Diego (Causal
Learning and Reasoning in Childhood, protocol 151866S).
Materials and procedure.
Spatial analogy task. The spatial analogy task gave children
the opportunity to solve either a near or far analogy using puzzle
boxes constructed from green or blue poster board (Figure 1; see
Appendix A for a complete script of the procedure). All children
were presented with the source puzzle, which was green and
pyramid-shaped, with four triangular sides. The box featured a
triangular door on its front, held closed with a rubber band, and
three identical triangular openings on its base, covered by trian-
gular felt flaps. Participants were told, “I have never seen this toy
before, but someone told me there is a sticker hidden inside.
Would you help me find the sticker by exploring the toy?” Chil-
dren were encouraged to explore until they located the sticker,
which was first hidden in either the bottom-center opening (n 47
children) or in the opening on the front (n 49). The experimenter
provided leading prompts to any child who failed to find the
sticker themselves. Once the child successfully located the sticker,
the puzzle was removed.
Participants were then presented with a near or far target puzzle
box, according to their condition. Both boxes contained analogous
hiding locations as the source but varied in the degree of surface
similarity. Children in the near condition were presented with a
target that was identical to the source, except for its color (blue).
To prevent children from relying exclusively on the perceptual
correspondence between hiding locations, the three doors on the
base of the source and target puzzles were identical, serving as
twin items (see Blades & Cooke, 1994). Given the presence of
three potential object matches, solving the near analogy for the
bottom-center location required that children use the relational
correspondence among the doors. In other words, if children
attempted to locate the sticker by exclusively searching for an
object match, they would be forced to search randomly from
among the three doors.
Children in the far condition were presented with a target that
differed from the source in both color and shape. The far target box
was blue and cube-shaped, with four square sides. This puzzle
featured a square-shaped door on its front, held closed with a
rubber band, and three identical square-shaped openings on its
base, covered by square-shaped felt flaps. In both conditions, a
sticker could be found in the analogous location. Upon presenta-
tion of the target, the experimenter said, “I have never seen this toy
before either, but someone told me there is also a sticker hidden
inside it. If you had one guess, where would you look to find the
sticker?”
Children were not explicitly instructed to compare the two
boxes, nor were they prompted to draw an analogy. Instead, we
Figure 1. Spatial analogy task. Illustration of spatial analogy task, including the (a) source puzzle box, (b) near
analogy target puzzle box, and (c) far analogy target puzzle box. The front view (top row) shows how each box
was presented to the children, with the front door visible and the bottom doors hidden underneath the base of
the toy. The base view (bottom row) shows the same boxes flipped to reveal the base of the toy. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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1835FAR ANALOGIES PROMOTE RELATIONAL REASONING
were interested in assessing whether preschoolers would first
search for the sticker in the same location as the hiding box, and
whether this tendency would be influenced by condition. In par-
ticular, we were interested in children’s tendency to spontaneously
use an analogical reasoning strategy when confronted with a novel
problem. Spontaneous analogies were coded on the basis of the
child’s first action (children received a 1 if they first searched in
the analogous opening and a 0 if they first performed any other
action). The production of an analogy on children’s first action was
interpreted as evidence that children spontaneously used relational
similarity as a strategy. However, regardless of whether the child
correctly located the sticker on this first action, all children were
prompted to continue to search until they found the sticker. As a
result, all children had the opportunity to observe the relational
similarity between the two hiding events.
After children located the second sticker in the first hiding
event, they were told that the experimenter was going to hide the
stickers in both boxes again. Children were asked to turn around
and close their eyes so that they could not see where the stickers
would be hidden. The experimenter moved the stickers in the
source and target boxes to the second hiding location, either behind
the bottom-center or front door. Then, all children were shown the
location where the sticker was hidden in the source box and were
again given the opportunity to locate the sticker inside either the
near or far target box on their own. Production of spontaneous
analogies for this second hiding event were coded according to the
same criteria, based on children’s first action. We were particularly
interested to assess any increase in children’s reliance on a rela-
tional strategy during this second hiding event, given their expo-
sure to the analogical mapping during the first hiding event in both
conditions. Regardless of whether children correctly located the
sticker on their first try, all children were again provided the
opportunity to continue to search until they located the sticker in
the analogous location. Children in both near and far conditions
were therefore provided with two hiding events, and two oppor-
tunities to observe the relationship between the source and target
puzzle boxes. The sequence of hiding locations was counterbal-
anced.
Transfer task. A perceptual mapping task adapted from Gent-
ner and Rattermann (1991) was used to assess transfer of relational
reasoning in both conditions. To differentiate this task from the
spatial analogy task, the experimenter introduced the materials
saying, “Now we are going to play a different game!” The exper-
imenter then assigned a set of three cups to themselves and to the
child. The cups were arranged in a row, from smallest to largest (see
Figure 2). The cups in the experimenter’s row were sized small (A),
medium (B) and large (C), and the cups in the child’s row were sized
medium (B), large (C), and extra large (D). Therefore, the midsized
cup in the experimenter’s row was identical to the smallest cup in the
child’s row. The experimenter revealed a sticker hidden inside the
midsized cup (B) in her row and prompted the child to locate the
sticker hidden inside their own row. The experimenter said, “The
sticker in your row is hidden in the same place as the sticker in my
row.” This instruction was left intentionally ambiguous so that it
might be interpreted in terms of an object or relational match. Chil-
dren were then given one opportunity to select a cup to locate the
sticker. Critically, children could privilege the cup of the same abso-
lute size (object match B) or a cup of the same relative size (relational
match C). Children received 1 point for selecting the relational cup
(C) and 0 points otherwise. Sets of cups were composed of silver
measuring cups, striped boxes, or unfinished wooden stacking dolls.
The three types of stimuli were counterbalanced with no differences
found.
In both conditions, a second researcher who was naïve to the
purpose of the experiment recorded responses for both tasks.
Interrater reliability was very high; the coders agreed on 98% of
responses. Minor disagreements were decided by discussion with
a third researcher.
Results and Discussion
We were interested in comparing performance between ages and
near and far conditions on two measures: whether children spon-
taneously drew an analogy between the puzzle boxes in the spatial
analogy task, and whether children privileged the relational match
(C) in the transfer task. We report the results of each analysis
below.
Spontaneous analogy production. Children in both near and
far conditions were provided with two opportunities to produce a
spontaneous analogy during the spatial analogy task, and the
hiding locations and sequence of these events were counterbal-
anced. We therefore first examined differences in the frequency of
children’s production of a spontaneous analogy for each condition
(near, far), age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds), hiding location (front,
bottom), and event order (1st hiding event, 2nd hiding event).
Loglinear analysis revealed a main effect of age, 2(1, N 
96)  3.87, p  .05, with 5-year-olds significantly more likely to
produce a spontaneous analogy than 4-year-olds, and a significant
interaction between age and order, 2(1, N  96)  4.57, p  .05.
Specifically, older children were more likely than younger ones to
improve across trials. Although there was an equal difference
between the two age groups when considering those who correctly
produced a spontaneous analogy during the first hiding event and
those who did not (correct minus incorrect  14 for 5-year-olds
and 14 for 4-year-olds), there was a difference between age groups
during the second hiding event (correct minus incorrect  26 for
5-year-olds and 16 for 4-year-olds). There was also a main effect
of hiding location, 2(1, N  96)  77.75, p  .001, and a
significant interaction between hiding location and order, 2(1,
Figure 2. Transfer task. Illustration of transfer task (adapted from Gent-
ner & Rattermann, 1991). A sticker was hidden in the midsized cup (B) in
the experimenter’s row. There are two possible matches in the child’s row:
the cup in the same location (relational match, C), or the identical cup
(object match, B).
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1836 WALKER, HUBACHEK, AND VENDETTI
N  96)  11.13, p  .001, on spontaneous analogy production.
Proportion of spontaneous analogies for each of these variables is
reported in Table 1.
As illustrated in Table 1, spontaneous analogies were at ceiling
for the front hiding location, regardless of condition. Whenever the
sticker was hidden in the front hiding location during the first
hiding event, 100% of children in both conditions produced a
spontaneous analogy. This is likely because the front door, unlike
the three identical doors on the base of the box, was a perceptually
unique hiding location, which allowed children to rely exclusively
on an object matching strategy (Blades & Cooke, 1994). The door
was also located directly in front of the child, was the only hiding
location that was clearly visible upon introducing the puzzle, and
the child had not yet been exposed to other hiding locations. When
the sticker was hidden in the front during the second event, after
children had been exposed to other possible hiding locations,
performance decreased a small amount (92% overall). These re-
sults provide reason to believe that children’s success in this case
reflects their baseline assumptions and/or perceptual matching, not
analogical transfer.
Given these results, we ran a second, more informative loglinear
analysis, excluding the front hiding location. This analysis reveals
a significant effect of order on the production of spontaneous
analogies for the bottom location, 2(1, N  96)  6.56, p  .01,
and a marginal effect of condition, 2(1, N  96)  7.81, p  .06
(see Figure 3). In particular, relatively few children drew a spon-
taneous analogy on the first hiding event, with 30% in the near
condition and 25% in the far condition, and no difference between
conditions, 2(1, N  96)  .17, p  .68. However, on the second
hiding event, performance improved, with 68% of children in the
near condition and 38% of children in the far condition producing
a correct analogy, with a significant effect of condition, 2(1, N 
96)  4.57, p  .03. In line with our first hypothesis, children in
the near condition were therefore significantly more likely than
children in the far condition to generate a spontaneous analogy.
The proportion of spontaneous analogies was particularly high,
given the large number of possible actions that a child could take
(i.e., open the front door, check the bottom-left or bottom-right
flaps, explore the sides, top, seams, or corners). However, order
effects indicate that this strategy was only spontaneously em-
ployed after children had the opportunity to observe the outcome
of the first hiding event, even when there was a high amount of
perceptual similarity between the source and target boxes.
An analysis of the number of unique actions on each puzzle
shows no differences between children in the near and far condi-
tions in terms of the average number of actions taken for those who
did not generate a spontaneous analogy. The mean number of
actions prior to sticker discovery was statistically equivalent (near:
M  1.33, far: M  1.42), t(53)  .56, p  .58. It is therefore
unlikely that the far puzzle was simply more difficult to solve.
Instead, the degree of perceptual similarity between the two puz-
zles in the near condition probably served to scaffold children’s
spontaneous analogy production (e.g., Gentner, 2010).
An analysis of the total amount of time (in seconds) each child
spent searching for the sticker in the second (target) puzzle box
across the 1st and 2nd hiding events (beginning when the exper-
imenter passed the puzzle to the child, and ending when the child
located the sticker) also shows no difference between conditions
(near: n 33, M 56.39; far: n 33, M 57.94), t(64).21,
p  .83. We can conclude, therefore, that the far puzzle did not
result in increased processing or errors.
Transfer task. The proportion of relational matches (C) in the
transfer task for children in near and far conditions appear in
Figure 3. Children in the near condition selected the relational
match no more often than chance (35%), p  .87 (exact binomial,
chance  .33), with a non-significant majority selecting the object
match (B) (40%), p  .44, and a minority selecting the non-match
(D) (25%). In contrast, children in the far condition selected the
relational match (C) significantly more often than chance (61%),
p  .001 (exact binomial, chance  .33), with a minority selecting
the object match (B) (27%) or non-match (D) (12%).
We next examined differences in the frequency of relational
matches in the transfer task for each condition (near, far) and each
age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds). Loglinear analysis revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of condition on relational transfer, 2(1, N 
96)  6.07, p  .01,   .25, and no effect of age, 2(1, N 
96)  1.27, p  .26 (ns),   .12. In line with our second
hypothesis, these findings demonstrate that generating a far anal-
ogy facilitates subsequent relational reasoning in preschool-aged
children.
Finally, we examined the relationship between spontaneous
analogies produced in the spatial analogy task, and subsequent
relational matches in the transfer task. Given that we found no
significant effect of order (bottom 1st, bottom 2nd) on transfer,
2(6, N 96) 6.38, p .84, we again excluded the front hiding
location, due to ceiling performance. We then categorized all
children according to whether or not they generated a spontaneous
Table 1
Proportion of Spontaneous Analogies Produced by Condition,
Hiding Location, and Hiding Event Order
Condition First hiding event Second hiding event
Near Front 1 Bottom .68
Bottom .3 Front .87
Far Front 1 Bottom .38
Bottom .25 Front .96
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Spontaneous Analogy Transfer Task
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
C
or
re
ct
Near
Far
Figure 3. The proportion of spontaneous analogies generated for the
bottom hiding location of the spatial analogy task (including both first and
second hiding events; left) and the proportion of relational matches se-
lected in the transfer task (right) for children in near and far conditions.
The dashed line indicates chance performance (.33%), for the transfer task
only.
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analogy and compared each group’s performance on the transfer
task. Children in the near condition who generated a spontaneous
analogy (n  24) were significantly more likely to select the
relational match (50% relational matches) than children who did
not (n  24, 21% relational matches), 2(1, N  48)  4.46, p 
.03,   .30. This suggests that successfully solving a near
analogy does not dampen or disrupt relational responding. Inter-
estingly, this effect did not hold for children who generated a
spontaneous analogy in the far condition (n  15). These children
were no more likely to select the relational match (53%) than
children who did not (n 33, 64%), 2(1, N 48) .46, p .50,
  .1. In fact, when combining children across conditions,
generation of spontaneous analogies did not significantly predict
relational selections on the subsequent task, 2(1, N  96)  .3,
p  .58,   .06.
However, given the possibility of a difference in strategy used
during the 1st hiding event and 2nd hiding event (i.e., after
children observed initial evidence for the relation between the
puzzles), we also conducted a more stringent test of the relation-
ship between spontaneous analogy and transfer by dividing all
participants into groups based on their order (bottom first, bottom
second). Results of loglinear analysis found no significant effect of
spontaneous analogy production in either group, 2s(N  48)  1,
(p .96; p .99, ns). These data suggest that relational transfer is not
solely driven by individual differences in analogical ability.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with
the claim that engaging in far analogies supports subsequent rela-
tional reasoning in children. However, the alternative—that solv-
ing a near analogy may promote attention to objects, bypassing
relational reasoning altogether—is also a possibility. You might
imagine, for example, that locating a sticker in a nearly identical
box leads children to search for identical elements in the transfer
task. In Experiment 2, we therefore further examine the mecha-
nisms underlying these effects.
Experiment 2
Given our interest in examining the specific impact of distance
(near vs. far analogies) on children’s subsequent relational selec-
tions, Experiment 2 was designed to assess their baseline tendency
to privilege relational matches in the transfer task. To do so, we
replaced the spatial analogy task that was used in Experiment 1
with a non-analogy search task. By comparing children’s search
behavior and relational selections in this baseline condition with
their performance in Experiment 1, we assess whether children’s
relational reasoning was supported or disrupted in each condition
above.
Method
Participants. A total of 48 4- and 5-year-olds (M  60.3
months, range  48.8–70.9 months, SD  6.8, females  28)
participated. Recruitment procedures were identical to those used
in Experiment 1, and participants were comparable in age, gender,
and demographics. One additional child was tested but excluded
due to experimenter error.
Materials and procedures. Materials were identical to those
used in Experiment 1, with one critical change to the procedure:
Children in Experiment 2 did not receive the initial spatial analogy
task. Instead, children in this baseline condition searched for a
sticker in two hiding events (front and bottom-center) on the same
(source) puzzle box (see Appendix B for a complete script of the
baseline procedure). The experimenter used the same instructions
that appeared in the spatial analogy task, informing the child that
there was a sticker hidden inside the box. However, after the child
located the first sticker, the experimenter told the child that the
sticker would be rehidden, and they were given a second oppor-
tunity to locate the sticker in the same puzzle box. As in the two
conditions assessed in Experiment 1, the order of the hiding
locations in this baseline condition was counterbalanced, with half
of the children assigned to the front location and half assigned to
the bottom-center location for the 1st hiding event. Therefore,
unlike in the near and far conditions in Experiment 1, children in
Experiment 2 never had the opportunity to draw an analogy
between two puzzles. The subsequent transfer task was identical to
the one described in Experiment 1.
Again, a second naïve researcher recorded responses for both
tasks. Interrater reliability was very high; the coders agreed on
95% of responses. Minor disagreements were decided by discus-
sion with a third researcher.
Results and Discussion
The primary purpose of Experiment 2 was to compare the
frequency of children’s relational selections in the transfer task
following a non-analogy with those in the near and far conditions
reported in Experiment 1. However, since the data for this baseline
condition was collected after the completion of Experiment 1 and
participants could not be randomly assigned, we used a more
conservative alpha level of .025 to establish significance for all
condition comparisons.
To do so, we first calculated the frequency of relational matches
(C) for children in the baseline condition. Like children in the near
condition, those in the baseline condition selected the relational
match no more often than chance (33%), p  .1 (exact binomial,
chance  .33). However, unlike in the near condition, those in the
baseline condition selected the object match (B) significantly more
often than chance (63%), p  .0001, with very few children
selecting the non-match (D) (4%).
We next examined differences in the frequency of relational
matches in the transfer task for each condition (near, far, baseline)
and each age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds). Loglinear analysis re-
vealed a significant main effect of condition on relational transfer,
2(1, N  144)  8.89, p  .02,   .25, and no effect of age,
2(1, N  144)  .70, p  .40 (ns),   .07. Results of
chi-squares reveal no significant difference in relational respond-
ing between baseline and near conditions, 2(1, N  96)  .05,
p  .82,   .02, and a significant difference in relational
responding between each of these conditions and the far condition,
2(1, N  96)  7.07, p  .01,   .27 and 2(1, N  96) 
6.01, p  .02,   .25, respectively. However, there was a
significant difference in selections of the object match between
baseline and near conditions, 2(1, N  96)  5.04, p  .03,
  .23, with children in the baseline condition significantly
more likely to privilege the object match. This evidence suggests
that the near analogy condition in Experiment 1 did not serve to
disrupt relational responding by increasing children’s focus on
object similarity.
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To provide additional support for this claim, we also analyzed
children’s search behavior in the non-analogy hiding task. As in
Experiment 1, this analysis was limited to those participants with
video recordings available (n  26). This analysis included the
total number of unique actions, as well as the total time spent
searching for the sticker across the two hiding events (i.e., includ-
ing both front and bottom-middle, regardless of order). The mean
number of actions prior to sticker discovery across the two (unre-
lated) hiding events (M  4.54) was statistically greater than the
mean number of actions for the two (related) hiding events in
either the near (M  2.76), t (73)  7.76, p  .0001 or far
conditions (M  2.98), t (71)  6.65, p  .0001. There was also
a significant increase in search time (M  76.84) compared with
both near (M  56.39), t (57)  2.5, p  .01 and far (M 
57.94), t (57)  3.27, p  .001 conditions. These differences
suggest that children in both conditions in Experiment 1 likely
relied upon analogical reasoning as a strategy to facilitate efficient
search.
General Discussion
Previous research has proposed that generating analogies makes
it easier for learners to encode, store, and retrieve relational infor-
mation in novel situations (Holyoak, 2012). Here we examine
children’s tendency to spontaneously employ analogical reasoning
in the context of a novel problem, as well as their ability to transfer
a relational strategy between tasks. The current research extends
and elaborates upon two existing claims. First, preschool-aged
children do spontaneously use analogical reasoning, but do so to a
greater extent when the target and source share a greater amount of
surface features, and after observing evidence for the relation
between them (i.e., in the second hiding event). These results are
consistent with previous findings (e.g., DeLoache, Kolstad, &
Anderson, 1991; Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996; Loewenstein &
Gentner, 2001). However, engaging in a close comparison did not
lead to increased relational responding in a subsequent task. In-
stead, the generation of far analogies, in which the target and
source shared less perceptual similarity, was a more effective trigger.
These findings support the proposal that attempting to generate far
analogies evokes transfer of a relational strategy in children. They
also contradict previous claims that mapping between highly
aligned cases (i.e., a near analogy) necessarily “seeds” further
abstraction (Gentner, 2010, p. 761; see also, Kotovsky & Gentner,
1996; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2001; Marzolf & DeLoache, 1997;
Uttal, Schreiber, & DeLoache, 1995). While progressive alignment
works well for fostering relational mapping across highly similar
tasks, it does not appear to lead learners to generalize a relational
strategy to a novel context.
We also report findings regarding individual differences. Chil-
dren in the near condition who generated a spontaneous analogy
were more likely to select the relational match at transfer than
children who did not. This provides initial evidence that solving a
near analogy does not dampen or disrupt analogical reasoning.
However, we did not find this same correlation for children in the
far condition. These findings suggest that it is the process of
attempting to solve a far analogy that facilitates relational transfer,
regardless of whether the learner gets the analogy right (i.e., the
product of analogical inference). In other words, the effects of
engaging in far analogical reasoning are not entirely reducible to
the benefits of identifying the relation (e.g., see Gentner, Loew-
enstein, & Thompson, 2003; Novick & Holyoak, 1991; Shtulman,
Neal, & Lindquist, 2016).
This work leaves several open questions. First, although we
provide evidence that a relational strategy can be induced within a
domain (i.e., generating a far spatial analogy evokes relational
reasoning in another spatial task), future work should consider
cases of cross-domain transfer, which would more closely parallel
adult work (Vendetti et al., 2014). Relatedly, the semantic relation
“middle” happened to appear more than once: first in the solution
for one of the two initial hiding events (the center door on the base
of the puzzle box), and again in the transfer task (midsized cup). It
is unlikely, but possible that children were inadvertently primed to
consider this relation. That said, this would not explain the differ-
ence of interest (i.e., relational responding in near vs. far condi-
tions), given that all children received this input. Further, if results
were due to priming a specific relation, then we would expect to
observe a correlation between the two tasks in the far condition. In
fact, we find the opposite. Additionally, according to Loewenstein
and Gentner (2001), comparing highly similar cases should better
enable children’s tendency to recognize relational information. In
other words, if the near spatial analogy task served to prime the
“middle” relation, this should have been more salient for the
subsequent inference. Again, however, we find the opposite pat-
tern of results.
Finally, although we provide evidence that far analogies pro-
mote relational reasoning, future research is needed to assess why
this occurs. Comparing the results of Experiments 1 and 2 provide
substantial evidence against the possibility that solving a near
analogy promotes attention to objects, bypassing relational reason-
ing altogether. Specifically, while there was no evidence for dif-
ferences in relational responding between near (Experiment 1) and
baseline (Experiment 2) groups, we did find significantly fewer
object-matches during the transfer task in the near condition. If it
were the case that the near condition promoted attention to objects,
we should see an increase in object-based responses. Also, as
noted above, the correlation found between spontaneous analogies
and subsequent relational responses in the near condition indicate
that successfully solving a near analogy does not disrupt relational
responding.
Another possibility, suggested by Vendetti and colleagues (2014),
is that generating far analogies results in a “relational mindset,”
allocating attention to relations, as opposed to perceptual features.
It is also possible that generating far analogies promotes the
flexible use of knowledge, making both relational and object-based
hypotheses more accessible at transfer. This might change the
requirements of the learning problem from generating the most
appropriate kinds of hypotheses to evaluating them. Of course,
another possibility is that this process deemphasizes attention to
object-based hypotheses. Specifically, when solving a far analogy,
reasoners are unable to rely upon object-based cues, as this would
interfere with mapping. To reduce this interference, the reasoner
may inhibit overall attention to these cues.
In line with these possibilities, we suggest that the process of
solving far analogies provides essential contextual cues to facili-
tate hypothesis generation and/or evaluation in children (i.e.,
which hypotheses are considered and/or ultimately selected). This
is particularly helpful in ambiguous contexts in which more than
one hypothesis is possible. In fact, Brown and colleagues (1986)
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suggest that children’s tendency to prioritize surface features,
rather than assuming structural similarity, may be a rational response
to reduce interference in learning. After all, successful learning in-
volves instances of generalization between related events and discrim-
ination between unrelated ones.
In sum, given the large literature on the benefits of scaffolding
for relational reasoning and emerging evidence that relational
abilities are in place much earlier than was previously believed
(Ferry, Hespos, & Gentner, 2015; Hochmann, Mody, & Carey,
2016; Walker & Gopnik, 2014, 2017), the relational shift may be
better characterized as a process of coming to recognize those
learning contexts in which generalization is an appropriate strat-
egy. It is not that children cannot engage in abstract relational
reasoning, but that they typically do not. From this perspective, the
source of children’s difficulty in generating relational solutions is
due to difficulties associated with decontextualized problems.
Once context is provided, children are able to capitalize on what
they know and apply this knowledge in a flexible way.
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Appendix A
Scripts for Near/Far Spatial Analogy Task
[Place the source toy on the table.] “Look! I found a toy for us
to play with. I have never seen this toy before, but someone told
me there is a sticker hidden inside of it! Would you help me find
the sticker by exploring the toy?” [Child searches until the sticker
is found.]
“Look, here’s another toy for you to play with! I have never seen
this toy before either, but someone told me there is also a sticker
hidden inside it. If you had one guess, where would you look to
find the sticker?” [Record first action.]
(If found) “Great job!”
(If not found) “Nope. Keep looking! Can you explore the toy to
help me find the sticker?” [Record all actions.]
“Great. Now I am going to hide the stickers again! Turn
around and close your eyes while I hide the sticker.” [Move the
stickers to the second hiding location. Place the source toy on
the table again.]
“Now the sticker is here!” [Reveal the second hiding location.
Remove the source toy from view, and place the target toy on the
table again.]
“Where do you think the sticker is now? If you had one guess,
where would you look to find the sticker?” [Record first action.]
(If found) “Great job!”
(If not found) “Nope. Keep looking! Can you explore the toy to
help me find the sticker?” [Record all actions.]
Appendix B
Script for Baseline Hiding Task
[Place the source toy on the table.] “Look! I found a toy for us
to play with. I have never seen this toy before, but someone told
me there is a sticker hidden inside of it! Would you help me find
the sticker by exploring the toy?” [Child searches until the sticker
is found. Record all actions.]
“Great job! Now I am going to hide the sticker again! Turn
around and close your eyes while I hide the sticker.” [Move the
sticker to the second hiding location. Place the source toy on the
table again.]
“Can you help me try to find the sticker again by exploring the
toy? Where would you look to find the sticker?” [Child searches
until the sticker is found. Record all actions.]
“Great job!”
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